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The Complete Differential Game of Active Target Defense
Eloy Garcia, David W. Casbeer, and Meir Pachter
Abstract—In the Target-Attacker-Defender (TAD) differen-
tial game, an Attacker missile strives to capture a Target
aircraft. The Target tries to escape the Attacker and is aided
by a Defender missile which aims at intercepting the Attacker
before the latter manages to close in on the Target. The conflict
between these intelligent adversaries has been suitably modeled
as a zero-sum differential game. Optimal strategies have been
synthesized covering the region of the state space where the
Target/Defender team is able to win the game. However, the
Game of Degree in the Attacker’s region of win has not
been fully addressed. Preliminary attempts at designing the
players’ strategies have not been proven to be optimal in the
differential game sense. The main results of the paper present
the optimal strategies of the Game of Degree in the Attacker’s
winning region of the state space. It is proven that the obtained
strategies provide the saddle-point solution of the game; the
Value function is obtained and it is shown to be continuous
and continuously differentiable. It is also demonstrated that it
is the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation.
Finally, the obtained strategies are compared to recent results
addressing the TAD differential game in [22]. It is shown
by counterexample that the strategies proposed in [22] are
not optimal. The unique regular solution of this differential
game that actually provides a semipermeable Barrier surface
is synthesized and verified in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
In conflict and combat scenarios involving autonomous
agents, the synthesis of intelligent actions must consider
the potential strategies by the adversary. Uncertainty on the
adversary’s behavior, actions, and/or decisions represents one
of the main challenges when analyzing possible outcomes of
conflict situations. Differential game theory [1], [2] provides
the right framework to analyze dynamic conflict and combat
scenarios and to design optimal strategies for each one of
the players.
Differential game theory has been applied to the study of
pursuit-evasion problems [3], [4]. Pursuit-evasion problems
also arise in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) operations
such as in [5] where a receding-horizon approach provides
evasive maneuvers for a UAV assuming a known pursuer’s
input. In [6], a multi-agent scenario is considered where a
number of pursuers are tasked to intercept a group of evaders
and where the goals of the evaders are assumed to be known.
The interesting problem in [7] considered the dynamic
game of a fast pursuer trying to capture in minimal time
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two slower evaders in succession. The evaders, on their
part, cooperate and try to maximize the capture time. This
work was extended in [8] where the fast pursuer attempts
to sequentially capture several evaders. Similarly, the slow
evaders act as a team and cooperate in order to maximize
the total time from the beginning of the game until the
last evader is captured. The numerical solution provided in
that reference shows that the optimal strategies of every
player consist of constant headings (the pursuer’s heading
is piecewise constant as one could expect and it changes at
time instants when an evader is captured).
The problem of active defense of a target aircraft is studied
in this paper by means of differential game theory. The
Target (T ), the Attacker (A), and the Defender (D) are the
participants. In this scenario, A pursues and tries to capture
T . D aims at intercepting A before the latter can reach
T . Hence, agents D and T cooperate and form a team to
achieve interception of A by D and successful escape of
T . The Target-Attacker-Defender (TAD) differential game is
a two-termination set differential game where two distinct
outcomes can be obtained. The first outcome is given by
interception of A by D and T escapes. In this case the T/D
team wins the game. The second outcome is given by A
capturing T before being intercepted by D. In such a case
the Attacker wins the game. These two outcomes give rise to
the Game of Kind and its solution partitions the state space
into two regions of win: Re, the escape region, and Rc,
the capture region. This paper focuses on synthesizing the
optimal strategies of the players in the region Rc, where the
Attacker wins the game under optimal play.
Several references have considered the active defense of
aircraft. For instance, Li and Cruz [9] considered the game
of defending an asset from an attacking intruder using an
interceptor. The differential game of active target defense
in the presence of obstacles was analyzed in [10] and the
case where the defender is endowed with a positive capture
radius was addressed in [11]. Active defense when the Target
aircraft is non-maneuverable was investigated in [12] and
[13]. A differential game with multiple attackers, multiple
defenders, and a stationary target in a bounded domain was
analyzed in [14]. Due to numerical intractability the authors
of this reference use the solution of the single attacker-
single defender case in order to determine pairwise outcomes
favorable to the defender team. The work in [15] considers
a group of cooperative pursuers that try to capture a single
evader within a bounded domain. The papers [16]–[19]
provide different approaches to solve reach and avoid games.
The Active Target Defense Differential Game (ATDDG)
was introduced in [20] and further analyzed in [21]; it solves
the TAD differential game in Re, the T/D team’s winning
region. On the other hand the TAD differential game in the
region Rc, the Attacker’s winning region, was addressed in
the recent Reference [22]. However, that reference proposed
an incorrect solution. The authors of [22] failed to provide
the important property of a semipermeable surface. In other
words, the strategies designed in [22] do not guarantee that
the Attacker wins when the state of the system is in Rc,
where the Attacker is supposed to win.
We show by counterexample that when the state of the
system is in the Attacker’s winning region Rc and the
Attacker implements the strategy proposed in [22], then,
there exists a non-anticipative strategy for the T/D team
to actually defeat the Attacker and win the game. The T/D
team implements the optimal strategy derived in this paper
and the Attacker loses the game since it does not capture
the Target. However, if the Attacker employs the strategy
obtained in this paper then it can capture the Target regardless
of the strategy implemented by the T/D team; the best the
Target and Defender can do is to implement the solution
in this paper which is the saddle-point solution of the TAD
differential game.
The papers [23], [24] proposed a set of optimal strategies
for the TAD differential game in the Attacker’s winning
region employing a reduced state space and using the
geometric properties of the problem. However, proof of
optimality was absent in these papers; this issue is addressed
in the current paper by finding the Value function, the
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) Partial Differ-
ential Equation (PDE). The possible non-differentiability of
the solution of the HJI PDE is a concern in differential
games and a generalized solution concept is provided by
the viscosity solution [25], [26]. However, it is important to
note that non-differentiability is not an issue in this paper. By
using Isaacs’ method [1] the players’ optimal strategies are
synthesized. Absence of singular surfaces is demonstrated
and the Value function is C1. As it has been stated in [14],
Isaacs’ method is the ideal situation in differential games, if
it is attainable. Unfortunately, Isaacs’ method does not scale
well as the dimension of the state increases. Many games
may still have a classical solution in closed-form but it is
very difficult to obtain it. Hence, when the state space of the
differential game is of higher dimension, obtaining a closed-
form C1 Value function which is the classical solution of the
HJI PDE represents a valuable contribution.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. A
complete treatment of the TAD differential game in the
Attacker’s winning region is presented. Here, we provide
a rigorous synthesis of the players’ optimal strategies by
means of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle as opposed to the
geometric approach utilized in [23], [24]. Additionally, we
prove that the obtained solution is indeed the solution of the
differential game under consideration by obtaining the Value
function and showing that the Value function is continuous,
continuously differentiable, and it is the solution of the HJI
PDE. Furthermore, we show that the obtained solution is
equivalent to the ATDDG optimal solution when the state of
the system is located on the Barrier surface that separates
the two winning regions. Finally, we compare the obtained
strategies in this paper to recent results obtained in [22].
Both, in that reference and in this paper, two outcomes of
the game are defined: 1) T is captured and A wins; 2) A is
intercepted by D before reaching T and the T/D team wins.
The Game of Kind is similarly solved in terms of terminal
distance between the players. However, capture time is used
as the objective function in [22] which results in Pure Pursuit
strategy for the Attacker to implement in its winning region.
Pure Pursuit is not the optimal strategy when the Attacker
pursues the Target in the presence of the Defender since we
are able to show that when the state of the game is initially in
the Attacker’s winning region, there exist an strategy (that we
also derived in this paper) such that the Defender intercepts
the Attacker and the Target escapes; the T/D team wins the
game. Also important is the fact that the strategies in [22]
do not result in a semipermeable barrier surface as it was
assumed in that reference. This is of great importance since
one of the teams is capable of switching the regions (make
the state to cross the barrier surface and change the outcome
of the game) by applying the optimal strategy in this paper
while the opponent applies the strategy in [22].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II states the
Target-Attacker-Defender (TAD) Differential Game and it
provides the solution to the Game of Kind. The Game of
Degree in the Attacker’s winning region is solved in Section
III. The properties of the game on the Barrier surface are
analyzed in Section IV. Illustrative examples are shown in
Section V. Concluding remarks are included in Section VI.
II. THE TAD DIFFERENTIAL GAME
A. Two-termination set differential game
The scenario of active target defense considers three
players: a Target (T ), an Attacker (A), and a Defender
(D) which have “simple motion” a` la Isaacs, they are
holonomic. The game is played in the Euclidean plane where
the controls of T , A, andD are their respective instantaneous
headings φ, χ, and ψ and their states are specified by their
Cartesian coordinates xT = (xT , yT ), xA = (xA, yA), and
xD = (xD, yD), as it is shown in Fig. 1. The players T ,
A and D have constant speeds denoted by VT , VA, and VD,
respectively. The complete state of the TAD differential game
is specified by x := (xT , yT , xA, yA, xD, yD) ∈ R6. The
game set is the entire space R6. The initial time is denoted
by t0 and the corresponding initial state of the system is
x0 := (xT0 , yT0 , xA0 , yA0 , xD0 , yD0) = x(t0).
The Target aircraft is slower than the Attacker missile, then
the speed ratio α = VT /VA < 1. When VA < VT there
is no need for a Defender, the Target always outruns the
Attacker. We assume that the Attacker and Defender have
similar capabilities, so VA = VD . Without loss of generality,
the players’ speeds are normalized so that VA = VD = 1
and VT = α.
Remark. When VA > VD (slower Defender) and point
capture is required then A always captures T irrespective of
the initial conditions. The slower agent, D in this case, is
incapable of achieving point interception of the faster agent,
A. Player A can always exploit its speed advantage to cir-
cumvent a slowly moving point and capture T . Additionally,
since α < 1 (T is slower than A) the T/D team is not able
to indefinitely keep A away from T or, in terms of [22],
keep the state such that R > 0 and r > 0 where R is the
A − T separation and r is the A −D separation. Hence, a
rendezvous strategy between T and D always results in T
being captured by A. Therefore, in this paper we focus on
the case VA = VD . The results can also be extended to the
case VD > VA.
The control input of the T/D team is the pair of instan-
taneous headings uT,D = {φ, ψ}. The Attacker’s control is
his instantaneous heading angle, uA = {χ}. The dynamics
x˙ = f(x, uA, uT,D) are specified by the system of ordinary
differential equations
x˙A = cosχ, xA(0) = xA0
y˙A = sinχ, yA(0) = yA0
x˙D = cosψ, xD(0) = xD0
y˙D = sinψ, yD(0) = yD0
x˙T = α cosφ, xT (0) = xT0
y˙T = α sinφ, yT (0) = yT0
(1)
where α < 1 is the problem parameter and the admissible
controls are given by χ, φ, ψ ∈ [−pi, pi]. Both, the state and
the controls, are unconstrained.
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Fig. 1. Target, Attacker, and Defender scenario
The terminal condition is point capture, that is, the separa-
tion between Target and Attacker becomes zero allowing the
Attacker to capture the Target and win the game. An alter-
native termination condition is when the separation between
Attacker and Defender is equal to zero; this case represents
interception of the Attacker by the Defender and the T/D
team wins. Hence, the termination set for the complete TAD
differential game is
S := Se
⋃
Sc (2)
where
Se :=
{
x |
√
(xA − xD)2 + (yA − yD)2 = 0
}
represents interception of the Attacker by the Defender (and
the Target escapes) and
Sc :=
{
x |
√
(xA − xT )2 + (yA − yT )2 = 0
}
represents the opposite outcome where the Attacker wins
by capturing the Target. Conceptually, the TAD differential
game with termination set given in (2) belongs to the
class of two-target or two-termination set differential games
which have been considered early by different authors [27]–
[29]. This two-termination set differential game concept was
introduced in order to extend classical pursuit-evasion games
where only one target, or termination, set exists. Naturally,
the two-target differential game is useful in the analysis of
combat games such as [29] and also the differential game
under consideration where the roles of pursuer and evader
are not designated ahead of time; instead each player wants
to defeat his opponent by terminating the game in its own
terminal set. In the TAD differential game the Attacker
pursues the Target but it is also being pursued by the
Defender. These roles of A and the associated termination
sets (2) suitably describe the possible outcomes of the TAD
scenario.
B. Game of Kind
Due to the two different outcomes of the TAD differential
game specified in (2), the Game of Kind needs to be
addressed and solved in order to partition the state space
into two winning regions, one for each team. Since different
Games of Degree are played in each region, it is essential
for each player to determine which region the current state
of the system lies in, then the corresponding Game of
Degree is solved and the appropriate optimal strategies are
implemented. The notions of Game of Degree and Game of
Kind are central in pursuit and evasion games [1]. The state
space R6 is partitioned into two sets: Re and Rc. Let us
note first that when the Target is closer to the Defender than
to the Attacker, the Target can always escape; even in the
case when α → 0 since the Target is already located in the
dominance region of the Defender. Thus, the closed half-
space Red belongs to the escape set Re, that is, Red ⊂ Re,
where
Red :=
{
x |
√
(xA − xT )2 + (yA − yT )2
−
√
(xD − xT )2 + (yD − yT )2 ≥ 0
}
.
(3)
We define the sets Rea and Rc as follows
Rea :=
{
x |x /∈ Red, B(x;α) < 0
}
Rc :=
{
x |x /∈ Red, B(x;α) > 0
} (4)
and the escape set is then
Re := Red ∪Rea. (5)
The Barrier surface is defined as
B := { x |x /∈ Red, B(x;α) = 0} (6)
where the Barrier function B(x;α) is explicitly characterized
as follows.
Theorem 1: For a given speed ratio parameter 0 < α < 1,
the Barrier surface that separates the state space R6 into the
two regions Re and Rc is given by B(x;α) = 0, where
B(x;α) = bxxx
2
T + byyy
2
T + 2bxyxT yT
+ 2bxxT + 2byyT + b.
(7)
The coefficients of (7) are given by
bxx = cos
2 σ − α2
byy = sin
2 σ − α2
bxy = sinσ cosσ
bx = α
2xA sin
2 σ − (1− α2)x0 cos2 σ
−[α2yA + (1 − α2)y0] sinσ cosσ
by = α
2yA cos
2 σ − (1 − α2)y0 sin2 σ
−[α2xA + (1− α2)x0] sinσ cosσ
b =
(
[α2yA + (1− α2)y0] sinσ
+[α2xA + (1− α2)x0] cosσ
)2 − α2(x2A+y2A)
(8)
where
cosσ = xA−xD√
(xA−xD)2+(yA−yD)2
sinσ = yA−yD√
(xA−xD)2+(yA−yD)2
x0(x) =
1
2 (xA + xD)
y0(x) =
1
2 (yA + yD).
For proof and additional details see [30].
Remark. The choice of notation in (7) is due to the fact
that the cross section of the Barrier surface B, for fixed A and
D positions, represents an hyperbola. This provides a clear
illustration of the points in the Cartesian plane for which the
Target is guaranteed to escape under optimal play – see Fig.
2. Note that only the A branch of the hyperbola is relevant
in the solution to the Game of Kind. The other branch is
irrelevant since it is located in D’s dominance region where
T can always escape since x ∈ Red holds. D’s dominance
region in Fig. 2 is delineated by the orthogonal bisector
(OBS) of the segment A−D.
If the state is such that x ∈ Re then the ATDDG Game of
Degree is played where the opposing teams try to min/max
the terminal A − T separation; this Game of Degree was
formulated and solved in [30]. By contrast, in this paper
we focus on the Game of Degree in the Attacker’s winning
region where the state is such that x ∈ Rc. We refer to
the Game of Degree in the Attacker’s winning region as the
Capture Differential Game (CDG). In the CDG, the opposing
teams try to min/max the terminal D − T separation.
C. The Game of Degree in Rc
The CDG is a perfect information game where every
player knows the dynamics (1) and the speed ratio parameter
α. The players have access to the state x at the current time
t. The optimal strategies will be state feedback strategies.
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Fig. 2. Cross section of the Barrier surface
Finally, and most importantly, it is assumed that the agents
do not know the opponent’s current decision: no discrimina-
tory/stroboscopic strategies are needed in the CDG.
The termination condition in the CDG is
xA = xT , yA = yT . (9)
The terminal manifold (9) is a four dimensional hyper-
plane in R6. The terminal time tf is not fixed and is
instead defined as the time instant when the state of the
system satisfies (9). At time instant tf the terminal state is
xf := (xTf , yTf , xAf , yAf , xDf , yDf ) = x(tf ). The terminal
cost/payoff is
J(uA(t), uT,D(t); x0) = Φ(xf ) (10)
where
Φ(xf ) :=
√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2. (11)
The cost/payoff functional depends only on the terminal
state; its Value is given by
V (x0) := max
uA(·)
min
uT,D(·)
J(uA(·), uT,D(·); x0) (12)
subject to (1) and (9), where uA(·) and uT,D(·) are the
teams’ state feedback strategies. In detail, the Attacker aims
at capturing the Target and maximizing the terminal T −D
separation. The Target and Defender, knowing that capture
of the Target is imminent under optimal play, cooperate in
order to minimize the terminal T −D separation.
The synthesis of optimal strategies of the CDG, the Game
of Degree when x ∈ Rc, is important because, together
with the solution of the ATDDG in [30], [31], the Game of
Degree when x ∈ Re, they provide the three players’ optimal
strategies everywhere in the state space R6 = Rc ∪ Re.
Therefore, the complete solution of the three-agent pursuit-
evasion TAD differential game which comprises a Target, an
Attacker, and a Defender is obtained.
The cost/payoff functional (10) is designed to mesh with
the cost/payoff functional defined in [30]. The ATDDG
is played in that case since x ∈ Re. The solutions of
both Games of Degree, the ATDDG in [30] and the CDG
in this paper, possess important properties related to two-
termination set differential games. The complete optimal
strategies comprising both Games of Degree result in a
semipermeable Barrier surface B that separates the two
winning regions. This semipermeable surface property is not
obtained in [22] where the same problem is considered. This
will be discussed in Section V.
The complete solution of the TAD differential game (con-
sisting of the solutions of the ATDDG and the CDG) yields
state feedback strategies for the players which possess the
continuity property expected in two termination set differ-
ential games. In more detail, when the state of the system
x is located on the Barrier surface, both, the CDG and the
ATDDG, have feasible solutions; furthermore, simultaneous
capture of T by A and interception of A by D is attained at
termination. Given the nature of the terminal cost functionals
in the CDG and in the ATDDG, the solution of the Game
of Degree in Rc needs to provide the same strategies and
the same Value of the game as the solution of the Game of
Degree in Re when simultaneous capture is realized, i.e. A
captures T at the same time instant when D intercepts A.
Thus, the game terminates on the subspace Se
⋂Sc. This
will be corroborated in Section IV.
Remark. The choice of cost/payoff in the CDG has also a
practical interpretation. Since it is specified by the solution
of the Game of Kind that A will capture T despite the best
efforts by the T/D team, then the logical strategy for D is to
try to reach a point at time tf which is as close as possible
to T . In the case A makes a mistake, the strategy of T & D
cooperating to minimize their terminal separation provides
a reasonable strategy and immediately takes advantage of
non-optimal behaviors of A. If player A pursues T using a
different guidance law other than the optimal strategy derived
in this paper, such as the Pure Pursuit guidance proposed
in [22], then, the terminal T − D distance will decrease
with respect to the guaranteed Value of the game, which
is attained when all players act optimally. And under further
non-optimal play by the Attacker, the state can cross the
Barrier surface and it will then hold that x ∈ Re where the
strategies of the ATDDG, the Game of Degree in Re, will
be employed by T and D, and now the Target can escape.
III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN Rc
In this section we provide the players’ optimal strategies in
the Attacker’s winning region. The solution is synthesized by
employing the “Two-sided” Pontryagin Maximum Principle
(PMP) which is also known as the “Two-person” extension of
the PMP [2]. This is justified due to the absence of singular
surfaces in the CDG, as was also the case in the ATDDG.
The state is denoted by x = (xT , yT , xA, yA, xD, yD) ∈ R6;
the dynamics are given by (1). The co-state is denoted by
λ := (λxA , λyA , λxD , λyD , λxT , λyT ) ∈ R6. We consider
the operationally relevant cost/payoff function (10) which is
evaluated when A captures T at time tf . The terminal time
tf is free and the terminal manifold Sc is the hyperplane in
R
6
Sc =


x |
[
1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 −1
]


xA
yA
xD
yD
xT
yT


= 02×1


(13)
The Hamiltonian of the differential game is
H = λxA cosχ+ λyA sinχ+ λxD cosψ
+ λyD sinψ + αλxT cosφ+ αλyT sinφ.
(14)
where the Hamiltonian and the dynamics are separa-
ble (or decoupled) in the controls φ, ψ and χ. Hence,
minφ,ψmaxχH = maxχminφ,ψH and Isaacs’ condition
holds.
The solution of the game of degree is given in the
following Theorem where the synthesis of the state feedback
optimal strategies of each player is obtained by employing
the “Two-sided” or “Two-person” PMP [2], [32]. Following
the construction of the regular solutions the Value function
V is explicitly derived and we show that V and ∂V
∂x
are
continuous for any x ∈ Rc; hence, no singular surfaces exist.
It is also shown that the Value function globally satisfies the
HJI equation in Rc, the winning region of A.
We introduce the A− T Apollonius circle
(x− xc)2 + (y − yc)2 = r2 (15)
where
xc =
1
1−α2 (xT − α2xA)
yc =
1
1−α2 (yT − α2yA)
r = α1−α2
√
(xT − xA)2 + (yT − yA)2.
(16)
Theorem 2: Consider the TAD Capture Differential Game
(CDG): (1), (9)-(12). Assume that x ∈ Rc. The problem
parameter is the speed ratio 0 ≤ α < 1. The optimal
state feedback strategies of the Target, the Defender, and
the Attacker are given by
cosφ∗ = x
∗(x)−xT√
(x∗(x)−xT )2+(y∗(x)−yT )2
sinφ∗ = y
∗(x)−yT√
(x∗(x)−xT )2+(y∗(x)−yT )2
(17)
cosψ∗ = x
∗(x)−xD√
(x∗(x)−xD)2+(y∗(x)−yD)2
sinψ∗ = y
∗(x)−yD√
(x∗(x)−xD)2+(y∗(x)−yD)2
(18)
cosχ∗ = x
∗(x)−xA√
(x∗(x)−xA)2+(y∗(x)−yA)2
sinχ∗ = y
∗(x)−yA√
(x∗(x)−xA)2+(y∗(x)−yA)2
(19)
where the capture point coordinates (x∗(x), y∗(x)) is a solu-
tion of the system of two equations, (15) and the following
equation
[(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2]
[
(x − xD)(y − yT )
−(x− xT )(y − yD)− α2(x− xD)(y − yA)
+α2(x− xA)(y − yD)
]2
−α[(x− xD)2 + (y − yD)2]
[
(x− xA)(y − yT )
−(x− xT )(y − yA)
]2
= 0.
(20)
The Value function is C1, it satisfies the HJI PDE, and is
explicitly given by
V (x) =
√
[x∗(x)− xD]2 + [y∗(x)− yD]2
− 1
α
√
[x∗(x)− xT ]2 + [y∗(x)− yT ]2. (21)
Proof. We first determine the optimal control inputs in
terms of the co-state variables. This can be directly obtained
from Isaacs’ Main Equation 1 (ME 1)
min
φ,ψ
max
χ
H = 0 (22)
and the optimal control inputs are characterized by the
relationships
cosχ∗ =
λxA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
, sinχ∗ =
λyA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
(23)
cosψ∗ = − λxD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
, sinψ∗ = − λyD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
(24)
cosφ∗ = − λxT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
, sinφ∗ = − λyT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
. (25)
The co-state dynamics are found from the corresponding
condition λ˙ = −∂H
∂x
which results in: λ˙xA = λ˙yA = λ˙xD =
λ˙yD = λ˙xT = λ˙yT = 0. Therefore, all co-states are constant
which means that the optimal headings χ∗, ψ∗ and φ∗ are
constant as well. The optimal trajectories are straight lines.
Concerning the solution of the attendant Two-Point
Boundary Value Problem (TPBVP) in R12 on 0 ≤ t ≤ tf , we
have six initial states specified by (1). In addition, six more
conditions at the terminal time tf are needed. In this respect,
define the augmented terminal value function Φa : R
6 → R1
Φa(xf ) :=
√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
+ ν1(xAf − xTf ) + ν2(yAf − yTf )
(26)
where ν1 and ν2 are Lagrange multipliers. The PMP,
or Dynamic Programming, directly yields the transversal-
ity/terminal co-state conditions
λ(tf ) =
∂
∂x
Φa(xf ) (27)
which results in the following relationships
λxA = ν1 (28)
λyA = ν2 (29)
λxD =
xDf − xTf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
(30)
λyD =
yDf − yTf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
(31)
λxT =
xTf − xDf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
− ν1 (32)
λyT =
yTf − yDf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
− ν2. (33)
At this point, we found that (28)-(33) together with eqs.
(9) yield eight conditions. However, only six conditions
are needed and we can eliminate the introduced Lagrange
multipliers ν1 and ν2 from (28)-(29) and (32)-(33) as follows
λxA + λxT =
xTf − xDf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
(34)
λyA + λyT =
yTf − yDf√
(xDf − xTf )2 + (yDf − yTf )2
. (35)
Then, the six terminal conditions are the two equations in
(9) in addition to (30)-(31) and (34)-(35). Since the terminal
time is not fixed, the PMP requirement that the Hamiltonian
H(x(t), λ(t), χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗)|tf ≡ 0 is used in order to determine
tf . Such requirement takes the form of Isaacs’ ME 1
λxA cosχ
∗ + λyA sinχ
∗ + λxD cosψ
∗
+λyD sinψ
∗ + αλxT cosφ
∗ + αλyT sinφ
∗ ≡ 0. (36)
Let xT = xT (t), yT = yT (t), xA = xA(t), yA = yA(t),
xD = xD(t), and yD = yD(t) be the instantaneous positions
at some time t < tf . From (1), and knowing that the optimal
headings of A, T , and D are constant, we can write
xTf = xT + α(tf − t) cosφ∗ (37)
yTf = yT + α(tf − t) sinφ∗ (38)
xAf = xA + (tf − t) cosχ∗ (39)
yAf = yA + (tf − t) sinχ∗ (40)
xDf = xD + (tf − t) cosψ∗ (41)
yDf = yD + (tf − t) sinψ∗. (42)
According to the terminal condition in (9) we can define
x ≡ xTf = xAf , y ≡ yTf = yAf . (43)
Since VT < VA and the optimal headings are constant, then
capture of T by A occurs on the A − T Apollonius circle
(15).
In addition, the co-state equations can be written in the
following form
λxD =
xDf − x√
(xDf − x)2 + (yDf − y)2
(44)
λyD =
yDf − y√
(xDf − x)2 + (yDf − y)2
(45)
λxA + λxT =
x− xDf√
(xDf − x)2 + (yDf − y)2
(46)
λyA + λyT =
y − yDf√
(xDf − x)2 + (yDf − y)2
. (47)
Substituting the co-states λxD and λyD into (24) we obtain
the optimal Defender heading in terms of (xDf , yDf ) which
is the terminal state of the Defender
cosψ∗ =
x−xDf√
(x−xDf )
2+(y−yDf )
2
sinψ∗ =
y−yDf√
(x−xDf )
2+(y−yDf )
2
.
(48)
Here we recall again that the optimal headings are constant,
therefore (48) can be equivalently written in terms of the
instantaneous state (xD, yD) as it is shown next
cosψ∗ = x−xD√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
sinψ∗ = y−yD√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
.
(49)
Additionally, since the optimal headings of A and T are
constant and A captures T at the interception point I : (x, y),
then we can write the optimal headings of the Attacker
and the Target in terms of their corresponding instantaneous
states (xA, yA) and (xT , yT ), respectively
cosχ∗ = x−xA√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
sinχ∗ = y−yA√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
(50)
and
cosφ∗ = x−xT√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
sinφ∗ = y−yT√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
.
(51)
From (23) and (50) we have that the Attacker’s states and
co-states satisfy
λxA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
= x−xA√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
λyA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
= y−yA√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
.
(52)
Similarly, using (25) and (51) we can obtain the correspond-
ing relationships for the Target
− λxT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
= x−xT√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
− λyT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
= y−yT√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
.
(53)
We have four equations (46), (47), (52), and (53) in the four
unknowns λxA , λyA , λxT , and λyT . Making the correspond-
ing substitutions between these equations we can write the
following
√
λ2xA + λ
2
yA
=
√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
× x−xDf−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yDf )
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)√
λ2xT + λ
2
yT
=
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
× x−xDf−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yDf )
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
Substituting the previous equations back into (52) and (53)
we obtain the solution
λxA =
x−xA√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
· x−xDf−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yDf )
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)
λyA =
y−yA√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
· x−xDf−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yDf )
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)
λxT =
xT−x√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
· x−xDf−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yDf )
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
λyT =
yT−y√
(xDf−x)
2+(yDf−y)
2
· x−xDf−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yDf )
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
.
(54)
These equations together with (44) and (45) specify the
co-states in terms of the instantaneous state components
(xA, yA, xT , yT ) but also in terms of the Defender’s terminal
position (xDf , yDf ). At this point we recall that the dynam-
ical equations were normalized by VA; hence, the terminal
time satisfies
tf − t = AI = 1αTI
= 1
α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2 (55)
which can be used to eliminate the dependence of equations
(44)-(45) and (54) on the Defender’s terminal position. The
goal is to determine expressions for each co-state that do not
depend on terminal states but on the instantaneous states in
order to obtain a state feedback strategy. This can be achieved
by using (41), (42), (49), and (55) in order to obtain the
following equations
xDf = xD
+ 1
α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2 x−xD√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
yDf = yD
+ 1
α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2 y−yD√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
.
(56)
Now we can use (56) in equations (44)-(45) and (54) and
obtain the expressions of the co-states in terms of the state
x and the point of interception coordinates (x, y):
λxD =
xD−x√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
λyD =
yD−y√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
λxA =
x−xA√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
· x−xD−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yD)
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)
λyA =
y−yA√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
· x−xD−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yD)
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)
λxT =
xT−x√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
· x−xD−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yD)
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
λyT =
yT−y√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
· x−xD−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yD)
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
.
(57)
We now turn our attention to equation (36), where we use
(49)-(51) for the optimal controls and (57) for the co-states
and we have that
(x−xA)
2+(y−yA)
2√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
· x−xD−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yD)
x−xA−
x−xT
y−yT
(y−yA)
− (xD−x)2+(yD−y)2√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
−α (x−xT )2+(y−yT )2√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
· x−xD−
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yD)
x−xA
y−yA
(y−yT )−(x−xT )
= 0
after the common term 1√
(xD−x)2+(yD−y)2
has been can-
celed. Using the relationships in (55) we can write
1
α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2 (x−xD)(y−yT )−(x−xT )(y−yD)(x−xA)(y−yT )−(x−xT )(y−yA)
−α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2 (x−xD)(y−yA)−(x−xA)(y−yD)(x−xA)(y−yT )−(x−xT )(y−yA)
=
√
(x− xD)2 + (y − yD)2.
Grouping terms and multiplying both sides of the previous
equation by α[(x − xA)(y − yT ) − (x − xT )(y − yA)] we
obtain√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2
[
(x − xD)(y − yT )
−(x− xT )(y − yD)− α2(x− xD)(y − yA)
+α2(x− xA)(y − yD)
]
= α
√
(x− xD)2 + (y − yD)2
[
(x− xA)(y − yT )
−(x− xT )(y − yA)
]
(58)
which can be written as in (20). The optimal interception
point I∗ : (x∗, y∗) is obtained by solving the systems of
polynomial equations (15) and (20). Therefore, the state
feedback optimal strategies have been obtained and the value
function is determined; it is C1 and is explicitly given by
(21). The gradient of the Value function, which is shown
in (68) below, is well defined in the region Rc. In order
to obtain
∂V (x)
∂x
we first compute the following term from
equation (15)
dy∗
dx∗
= −x∗−xc
y∗−yc
(59)
where xc, yc, r are given by (16).
The gradient of V (x) is ∂V
∂x
= [ ∂V
∂xi
+ dV
dx∗
· dx∗
dxi
, ∂V
∂yi
+
dV
dx∗
· dx∗
dyi
]T for i = A, T,D. We start by determining the
following term
dV
dx∗
=
x∗−xD−(y
∗
−yD)
x∗−xc
y∗−yc√
(x∗−xD)2+(y∗−yD)2
− x
∗
−xT−(y
∗
−yT )
x∗−xc
y∗−yc
α
√
(x∗−xT )2+(y∗−yT )2
(60)
where y∗ = yc +
√
r2 − (x∗ − xc)2.
Let us now write (58) as follows
(x−xD)(y−yT )−(x−xT )(y−yD)−α
2[(x−xD)(y−yA)−(x−xA)(y−yD)]√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
= α
2[(x−xA)(y−yT )−(x−xT )(y−yA)]
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
(61)
where the right hand side of this equation was multiplied and
divided by α. Let us add and subtract the term (x−xT )(y−
yT ) to the numerator of the right hand side of the equation
and, by rearranging terms, we have
(x−xD)(y−yT−α
2y+α2yA)−(y−yD)(x−xT−α
2x+α2xA)]√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
− (x−xT )(y−yT−α2y+α2yA)−(y−yT )(x−xT−α2x+α2xA)
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
= 0.
(62)
Dividing both sides of (62) by 1− α2 we obtain
(x−xD)
(1−α2)y−(yT −α
2yA)
1−α2
−(y−yD)
(1−α2)x−(xT−α
2xA)
1−α2√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
− (x−xT )
(1−α2)y−(yT −α
2yA)
1−α2
−(y−yT )
(1−α2)x−(xT−α
2xA)
1−α2
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
= 0.
Using the definitions in (16) we have that
(x−xD)(y−yc)−(y−yD)(x−xc)√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
− (x−xT )(y−yc)−(y−yT )(x−xc)
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
= 0.
(63)
Finally, dividing both sides of (63) by y − yc we obtain
(x−xD)−(y−yD)
x−xc
y−yc√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
− (x−xT )−(y−yT )
x−xc
y−yc
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
= 0. (64)
We have found that dV
dx∗
is equal to the left hand side of (64)
where y∗ = yc +
√
r2 − (x∗ − xc)2 and x∗ is a solution of
(20), equivalently, of (64). Therefore, we have that
dV
dx∗
= 0.
We now substitute y∗ = yc +
√
r2 − (x∗ − xc)2 in (21)
V (x) =√
[x∗(x)− xD]2 + [yc +
√
r2 − (x∗(x)− xc)2 − yD]2
− 1
α
√
[x∗(x)− xT ]2 + [yc +
√
r2 − (x∗(x)− xc)2 − yT ]2.
Since we have shown that dV
dx∗
= 0, then, the
gradient of V (x) is simplified and given by ∂V
∂x
=
[ ∂V
∂xA
∂V
∂yA
∂V
∂xT
∂V
∂yT
∂V
∂xD
∂V
∂yD
]T . We now obtain the
following
∂xc
∂xT
= ∂yc
∂yT
= 11−α2
∂xc
∂xA
= ∂yc
∂yA
= − α21−α2
∂r2
∂xT
= 2α
2
(1−α2)2 (xT − xA)
∂r2
∂yT
= 2α
2
(1−α2)2 (yT − yA)
∂r2
∂xA
= − 2α2(1−α2)2 (xT − xA)
∂r2
∂yA
= − 2α2(1−α2)2 (yT − yA).
(65)
The previous expressions are useful to compute the gradient
of V (x). Then, we can write
∂V
∂xA
=
− α
2[yc+
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2−yD][xT−xA+(1−α
2)(x∗−xc)]
(1−α2)2
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2
√
(x∗−xD)2+(yc+
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2−yD)2
+
α[yc+
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2−yT ][xT−xA+(1−α
2)(x∗−xc)]
(1−α2)2
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2
√
(x∗−xT )2+(yc+
√
r2−(x∗−xc)2−yT )2
(66)
which can be simplified in the following form
∂V
∂xA
= − α2[y∗−yD][xT−xA+(1−α2)(x∗−xc)]
(1−α2)2(y∗−yc)
√
(x∗−xD)2+(y∗−yD)2
+ α[y
∗
−yT ][xT−xA+(1−α
2)(x∗−xc)]
(1−α2)2(y∗−yc)
√
(x∗−xT )2+(y∗−yT )2
= − α2(y∗−yD)(x∗−xA)
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
√
(x∗−xD)2+(y∗−yD)2
+ α(y
∗
−yT )(x
∗
−xA)
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
√
(x∗−xT )2+(y∗−yT )2
= α x
∗
−xA
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
(67)
where TI =
√
(x∗ − xT )2 + (y∗ − yT )2 and DI =√
(x∗ − xD)2 + (y∗ − yD)2. We can now write the partial
derivatives of the Value function with respect to each com-
ponent of the state x and they are given by
∂V
∂xA
= α x
∗
−xA
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
∂V
∂yA
= α y
∗
−yA
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
∂V
∂xT
= x
∗
−xT
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yD
DI
− y∗−yA
AI
)
∂V
∂yT
= y
∗
−yT
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yD
DI
− y∗−yA
AI
)
∂V
∂xD
= −x∗−xD
DI
∂V
∂xD
= − y∗−yD
DI
(68)
where AI =
√
(x∗ − xA)2 + (y∗ − yA)2.
Finally, we show that the V (x) is the solution of the HJI
equation −∂V
∂t
= ∂V
∂x
· f(x, χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗) + g(t, x, χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗).
Note that in this problem ∂V
∂t
= 0 and g(t, x, χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗) = 0.
The HJI equation for the CDG is then given by
∂V
∂x
· f(x, χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗)
= − (x∗−xD)2
DI
− (y∗−yD)2
DI
+ α (x
∗
−xA)
2
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)AI
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
+ α (y
∗
−yA)
2
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)AI
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
+ α (x
∗
−xT )
2
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)TI
(
y∗−yD
DI
− y∗−yA
AI
)
+ α (y
∗
−yT )
2
(1−α2)(y∗−yc)TI
(
y∗−yD
DI
− y∗−yA
AI
)
(69)
Since A and D have the same speed, then the distances
satisfy AI = DI . Similarly, TI = αAI and we have that
∂V
∂x
· f(x, χ∗, ψ∗, φ∗)
= −1 + αAI(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yT
TI
− αy∗−yD
DI
)
+ αTI(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
(
y∗−yD
DI
− y∗−yA
AI
)
= −1 + α(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
[
1
α
(y∗ − yT )
− α(y∗ − yD) + α(y∗ − yD)− α(y∗ − yA)
]
= −1 + 1(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
[
y∗ − yT − α2(y∗ − yA)
]
= −1 + 1(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
[
(1− α2)y∗ − (1− α2)yc
]
= −1 + (1−α2)(y∗−yc)(1−α2)(y∗−yc)
= 0.
(70)
In summary, when x ∈ Rc, state feedback optimal strategies
of the three agents were synthesized and the Value function
was obtained. It was also shown that the Value function is
C1 and that it is the solution of the HJI equation. 
In order to obtain the optimal capture coordinates
(x∗(x), y∗(x)) the system of equations (15) and (20) needs
to be solved. The following result provides an equivalent
and more compact expression to determine the optimal
coordinates.
Corollary 1: The optimal capture coordinates are given
by x∗(x) = xc + r cosω
∗ and y∗(x) = yc + r sinω
∗ where
ω∗ is a solution of the following polynomial equation
r(a0−ib0)
4 v
6 + a1−ib14 v
5 + r(a2 − ib2)v4 + r
2a3
2 v
3
+r(a2 + ib2)v
2 + a1+ib14 v +
r(a0+ib0)
4 = 0
(71)
where v = eiw and
a0 = [(yc−yD)2 − (xc−xD)2](xc − xA)
+ [(xc−xA)2 − (yc−yA)2](xc − xD)
+ 2(yc − yD)(yc − yA)(xA − xD)
b0 = [(yc−yD)2 − (xc−xD)2](yc − yA)
+ [(xc−xA)2 − (yc−yA)2](yc − yD)
− 2(xc − xD)(xc − xA)(yA − yD)
a1 = 2[(xc−xA)2(yc−yD)2 − (xc−xD)2(yc−yA)2]
+ r2[(xc−xA)2−(xc−xD)2+(yc−yD)2−(yc−yA)2]
b1 = 2[(xc−xD)2 + (yc−yD)2 + r2](xc−xA)(yc−yA)
− 2[(xc−xA)2 + (yc−yA)2 + r2](xc−xD)(yc−yD)
a2 =
[(xc−xD)
2+3(yc−yD)
2](xc−xA)−[(xc−xA)
2+3(yc−yA)
2](xc−xD)
4
+ (yc−yD)(yc−yA)(xD−xA)2
b2 =
[3(xc−xD)
2+(yc−yD)
2](yc−yA)−[3(xc−xA)
2+(yc−yA)
2](yc−yD)
4
+ (xc−xD)(xc−xA)(yD−yA)2
a3 = (xc−xD)2 + (yc−yD)2 − (xc−xA)2 − (yc−yA)2.
(72)
IV. GAME OF DEGREE ON THE BARRIER SURFACE
In this section we show that both Games of Degree in the
TAD differential game: the CDG and the ATDDG, provide
the same solution when x ∈ B.
Theorem 3: On the Barrier surface, that is, when x ∈ B,
the CDG and the ATDDG provide the same solution and the
same Value of the game.
Proof. When the state of the system is such that x ∈ B, then
it holds that the A − T Apollonius circle is tangent to the
orthogonal bisector of the segment AD. Let the tangent point
be I : (x, y). It is easy to show that the line CI is parallel to
the line AD, where the point C is the center of the A − T
Apollonius circle. Equivalently, one can write
x−xc
y−yc
= xD−xA
yD−yA
(73)
Then, we are going to show that ω∗ = ρ in this case, where ρ
is the LOS angle form A to D; this is equivalent to selecting
the interception point I : (x, y), the tangent point. It will be
shown that this aimpoint choice solves the standing equation
(20). Note that the tangent point also solves (15) since it is a
point on the Apollonius circle. We will use (20) in the form
of (64) and, since equation (73) holds for this selection of
interception point we can write the left hand side of (64) as
follows
(x−xD)−(y−yD)
xD−xA
yD−yA√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
− (x−xT )−(y−yT )
xD−xA
yD−yA
α
√
(x−xT )2+(y−yT )2
(74)
we note that, since point I is located both on the orthogonal
bisector of the segment AD and on the A − T Apollonius
circle, then the terminal position of both T and D is equal
to I . Hence, their traveled distance satisfy TI = αDI and
(74) can be written as
1
α2(yD−yA)
√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
×(α2[(x − xD)(yD − yA)− (y − yD)(xD − xA)]
− (x− xT )(yD − yA) + (y − yT )(xD − xA)
)
.
(75)
Grouping like terms, the expression in (75) can be written
as follows
−1
α2(yD−yA)
√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
×((1−α2)[x(yD − yA) + y(xA − xD)] + yT (xD − xA)
+ xT (yA − yD) + α2(xAyD − xDyA)
)
.
(76)
From (16) we have that xT = (1−α2)xc+α2xA and yT =
(1− α2)yc + α2yA. Substituting these expressions into (76)
we obtain
−(1−α2)[x(yD−yA)+y(xA−xD)+yc(xD−xA)+xc(yA−yD)]
α2(yD−yA)
√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
= (1−α
2)[(xD−xA)(y−yc)−(yD−yA)(x−xc)]
α2(yD−yA)
√
(x−xD)2+(y−yD)2
= 0
(77)
where equation (73) was used in the second line of the
previous equation. Thus, the choice ω∗ = ρ, equivalently, the
aimpoint I : (x, y) which is the tangent point between the
orthogonal bisector and the Apollonius circle is a solution of
(15) and (20) and the Value is V (x|x ∈ B) = 0. Furthermore,
it can easily be shown that any other angle ω 6= ρ results
in a terminal separation DT > 0. Therefore, I : (x, y) is
the optimal interception point and A captures T at the same
time instant that D intercepts A, as expected.
Now, it will be shown that the optimal solution of the
ATDDG Game of Degree provides the same interception
point. The optimal solution of the ATDDG Game of Degree
is given by the rooting of equation (15) in Reference [30].
Similarly, we use the equivalent equation given by (77) in
Reference [30]; the left hand side of such equation is given
by
α
√
(x− xT )2 + (y − yT )2
− (x−xT )(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yT )(x−xA)(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yA)
√
(x− xA)2 + (y − yA)2
+ (x−xT )(y−yA)−(x−xA)(y−yT )(x−xA)(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yA)
√
(x− xD)2 + (y − yD)2
(78)
and we substitute ω∗ = ρ, equivalently, the aimpoint
I : (x, y) into (78). Under such selection of aimpoint we
have that the distance traveled by A and D is the same.
Additionally, TI = αAI . Hence, (78) can be written as
follows√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
(x−xA)(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yA)
×(α2[(x− xA)(y − yD)− (x− xD)(y − yA)]
+ (x− xT )(yD − yA)− (y − yT )(xD − xA)
)
=
√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
(x−xA)(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yA)
×((1−α2)[x(yD − yA) + y(xA − xD)] + yT (xD − xA)
+ xT (yA − yD) + α2(xAyD − xDyA)
)
.
(79)
Since ω∗ = ρ then (73) holds. Also, the term in brackets in
(79) is equal to the term in brackets in (76), then
√
(x−xA)2+(y−yA)2
(x−xA)(y−yD)−(x−xD)(y−yA)
×((1−α2)[x(yD − yA) + y(xA − xD)] + yT (xD − xA)
+ xT (yA − yD) + α2(xAyD − xDyA)
)
= 0.
Similarly, the choice ω∗ = ρ is a solution of equation (15)
in Reference [30] and the Value is V (x|x ∈ B) = 0, as
expected. In conclusion, the same Value of the game is
obtained by solving both Games of Degree and the optimal
strategies of the Game of Degree in Rc and of the Game of
Degree in Re are the same in the Barrier surface B.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section we provide illustrative examples. First, an
example where the state of the system is on the Barrier
surface is presented. Then, the optimal strategies of the CDG
are compared with respect to the strategies in Reference [22].
Example 1. Let us consider the initial positions T =
(7.5 − 3.28), A = (7.2 − 4.5), D = (3 − 2), and the speed
ratio α = 0.7. It holds that x ∈ B. In this example, since
x ∈ B, the players continuously solve both Games of Degree
and the optimal aimpoint is time-invariant and is the same by
using either the ATDDG or the CDG: I∗ = (6.305, −1.224).
The optimal trajectories are shown in Fig. 3.a. The Barrier
function is calculated continuously for all the duration of the
engagement and, as expected, B(x(t);α) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ tf
as illustrated in Fig. 3.b. Finally and also as one should
expect, all agents meet at the interception point at the same
time and the Value of the game is V (x) = 0.
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Fig. 3. Example 1. a) Optimal trajectories. b) Barrier function
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Fig. 4. Example 2. Optimal play: all agents implement the optimal
strategies of the CDG and the Attacker captures the Target before being
intercepted by the Defender
Example 2. Consider the speed ratio parameter α = 0.5
and the initial players’ positions T = (6.4 3), A = (8 0.5),
and D = (1.5 − 1). According to these parameters and
positions it holds that x ∈ Rc. The agents then play the
CDG and the optimal trajectories are shown in Fig. 4. Each
player in this example continuously recomputes the optimal
strategies (17)-(19) and it is obtained that the Barrier function
remains positive for the duration of the engagement and
that the optimal capture point is time-invariant along optimal
trajectories, as expected.
It is important to note that the Attacker, who initially was
prescribed to win the game, is able to hold the state of
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Fig. 6. Example 3. Attacker implements PP and it is intercepted by the
Defender before it can capture the Target
the system in its winning region regardless of the strategies
implemented by the T/D team and it actually captures the
Target by implementing its optimal strategy (19).
Example 3. We consider the same parameters and initial
conditions as in Example 2. Now the Attacker implements
the strategy in [22], where the seemingly optimal strategy
for the Attacker is to follow Pure Pursuit (PP) on the Target.
The Target and Defender will implement their cooperative
optimal strategies (17) and (18) of the CDG and switch to the
optimal strategies of the ATTDG when the state of the system
switches regions from Rc to Re; this occurs at around t =
0.243 as it is shown in Fig. 5.a. Fig. 5.b shows the difference
of the distances in (3). The system enters the subregion Red
at around t = 4.523. At this time B(x) becomes irrelevant
and the remaining portion has been shaded in the figure (
B(x) becomes positive again at the end indicating crossing
of the ‘D branch of the hyperbola’ which is the irrelevant
branch as previously explained in Section II-B).
The trajectories when A uses the PP strategy are shown
in Fig. 6. The T and D trajectories are not straight lines
since they react to the non-optimal guidance of the Attacker.
It is important to note that the Target and Defender do not
know the strategy of the Attacker; they do not know that
the Attacker is implementing the PP guidance. The T/D
team only uses the current state of the system, that is, the
instantaneous position of the players, in order to compute the
optimal strategies (17)-(18) and defeat the Attacker. The PP
strategy may seem reasonable since it aims at minimizing
capture time; however, due to the presence of the Defender
we can see in Fig. 6 that A, who initially was prescribed
to win the game, is not able to hold the state of the system
in its winning region and it ends up being intercepted by D
before it can capture T . Hence, the PP strategy obtained in
Reference [22] does not provide a semipermeable surface,
that is, the T/D team is able to win the game when it was
initially doomed. This is a courtesy of A who erroneously
implements the PP strategy. The PP strategy is not the
Attacker optimal strategy when it is pursuing the Target in
the presence of the Defender.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The differential game between the Target and Defender
team against the Attacker has been addressed with a focus on
the Attacker’s winning region. The optimal strategies of each
player were synthesized and these strategies were proven to
constitute the optimal solution of TAD Capture Differential
Game by obtaining the Value function and showing it is
continuous and continuously differentiable and it is also
the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. The
results of this paper were compared to existing approaches
highlighting the superiority and optimality of the strategies
obtained in this paper.
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